The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Canada's national poultry sectors have been responding to detections of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Canada since December 2021. Industry has been highly supportive of the CFIA in its response to HPAI, working collaboratively to implement control measures and protect animal health.
The CFIA has acted to minimize the risk of the virus spreading within Canadian flocks and to other animals. All avian influenza viruses, particularly H5 and H7 viruses, have the potential to infect mammals, including humans. Our disease response aims to protect public and animal health, minimize impacts on the domestic poultry industry and the Canadian economy.
On this page
- Stamping-out policy as a fundamental basis of HPAI response
- There are ongoing risks to animal health
- Stamping-out aims to minimize risk to human health
- Risks to export access and international trade
- Universal Ostrich Farm compliance issues
- Universal Ostrich Farm's unsubstantiated scientific research claims
- Current status of the CFIA's response at the ostrich infection premises
- CFIA's next steps at the infected premises
Stamping-out policy as a fundamental basis of HPAI response
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) response to highly pathogenic avian influenza in domestic poultry is based on an approach known as "stamping-out", as defined by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Stamping-out is the internationally recognized standard and is a primary tool to manage the spread of HPAI and mitigate risks to animal and human health as well as enable international trade. It includes steps to eliminate the virus from an infected premises, including:
- the depopulation of animals that are infected, suspected to be infected or exposed to HPAI
- the disposal of carcasses and associated animal products (such as manure) in a manner to prevent the transmission of the HPAI virus
- the cleaning and disinfection of the premises
While depopulation can be a distressing outcome for an animal owner, the CFIA works with poultry farmers to develop the most appropriate plan, see that it is completed humanely and to support producers in returning to operations as quickly as possible. On a typical infected premise, the CFIA strives to have depopulation completed within 48 to 72 hours after detection.
In addition to the depopulation activities at an infected premises, the CFIA establishes a primary control zone around the infected premises and implements movement controls. Tracing activities to reduce the risk of disease spread are completed. Post-outbreak surveillance and testing are also done before a primary control zone is removed.
The standardized steps to resuming operations at an infected premises and the path to revoking a primary control zone provide trading partners with confidence in Canada's delivery of the stamping-out policy and allows for exports of poultry and poultry products from areas recognized as avian influenza free by trading partners. Depending on the trading partner, this may be based on the individual control zones, affected municipalities/counties, provincial or national status.
There are ongoing risks to animal health
Allowing a domestic poultry flock known to be exposed to HPAI to remain alive means a potential source of the virus persists. It increases the risk of reassortment or mutation of the virus, particularly with birds raised in open pasture where there is ongoing exposure to wildlife.
Even when ostriches appear healthy, they can still spread disease. Scientific research has demonstrated that ostriches are known to spontaneously develop mutations making the virus more infectious to mammalian species. Sustained and repeated infections in these birds increase the opportunity for this mutation to occur.
Stamping-out aims to minimize risk to human health
CFIA's National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (NCFAD) identified that the current HPAI infection in these ostriches is a novel reassortment not seen elsewhere in Canada. This assortment includes the D1.3 genotype, which has been associated with a human infection in a poultry worker in Ohio.
A human case of H5N1 in BC earlier this year required critical care and an extended hospital stay for the patient and there have been a number of human cases in the United States, including a fatality.
Additionally, during recent judicial review proceedings, the CFIA learned that individuals associated with the infected premises have reported that they had their own blood tested and H5N1 antibodies were detected.
While no serious illnesses were reported to public health authorities, this apparent evidence of ostrich to human transmission is a concern and highlights the risk of delays in completing the disposal of an infected flock.
Risks to export access and international trade
Stamping-out and primary control zones enable international trade as it allows Canada to contain outbreaks within a specific area, meet the requirements of zoning arrangements with trading partners and permit Canada's poultry industry to export from disease-free regions. Continued export market access supports Canadian families and poultry farmers whose livelihoods depend on maintaining international market access for $1.75 billion in exports.
Several trading partners such as Mexico, Japan and Taiwan currently restrict the import of poultry products from the entire province of British Columbia due to the presence of HPAI. As the ostrich farm remains a confirmed infected premises in the province, the entire British Columbia poultry sector is not able to access certain export markets. Other trading partners such as China and South Africa currently restrict import of poultry products from all of Canada due to the ongoing presence of HPAI.
Universal Ostrich Farm compliance issues
Universal Ostrich Farm has not cooperated with the requirements set out under the Health of Animals Act (HAA).
The farm owners failed to report the initial cases of illness and deaths to the CFIA, as required by the HAA. After being placed under quarantine as an infected place, Universal Ostrich Farm failed to adhere to quarantine orders. Universal Ostrich Farm was issued two notices of violations with penalty, totaling $20,000.
The farm also failed to undertake biosecurity risk mitigation measures. This includes a failure to address significant biosecurity hazards such as the accumulation of manure, the encouraging of wild birds to feed with the ostriches and the improper handling and disposal of deceased animals that have been infected with or exposed to HPAI.
These actions significantly increase the risk of disease transmission and reflect a disregard for regulatory compliance and animal health standards.
Universal Ostrich Farm's unsubstantiated scientific research claims
Antibody production is an important area of scientific research, but the CFIA has not received any evidence of it being done at the infected premises.
Research documentation was not provided during the review of their request for exemption from the disposal order based on unique genetics or during the judicial review process.
To be precise:
- the CFIA has not received formal documentation of research involving this flock, such as active research trial logs or detailed research protocols
- no formal documentation of antibody production and collection from the flock has been provided
- the CFIA has not received any research to show the flock of ostriches currently under quarantine has a unique capacity to produce eggs with antibodies
Further, the current physical facilities at their location are not suitable for controlled research activities or trials (for example no biocontainment measures to prevent interaction with, or exposure to, wildlife, no handling facilities that are required for routine live animal research).
The CFIA is aware of scientific research into the use of ostrich eggs for experimental antibody production. Antibodies can be produced in eggs from different bird species, including ostriches. Antigens can be introduced to a bird and antibodies collected from the eggs without the bird having been infected under natural conditions with a live virus.
Through a thorough review of scientific peer-reviewed literature, no evidence was found that a particular ostrich flock would be superior to other ostrich flocks for antibody production.
Current status of the CFIA's response at the ostrich infection premises
On May 13, 2025, the Federal court dismissed both Universal Ostrich Farm's applications for judicial review. The interlocutory injunction pausing the implementation of the disposal order was also vacated. A motion for appeal has been filed by Universal Ostrich Farm in the Federal Court of Appeal.
Following the May 13 court ruling, the farm owners and family members encouraged supporters to come to the farm. An encampment of supporters has been set up at the farm with the goal of raising awareness of the activities at the farm and in an apparent attempt to prevent the CFIA from carrying out its operations at the infected premises.
A Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) presence is now required for any CFIA on-farm activities.
The owners have not taken appropriate action to mitigate various biocontainment risks such limiting wild bird access to the ostriches, controlling water flow from the quarantine zone to other parts of the farm, or improving fencing.
These factors have delayed a timely and appropriate response to the HPAI infected premises, resulting in ongoing health risks to animals and humans.
CFIA's next steps at the infected premises
Given that the flock has had multiple laboratory-confirmed cases of H5N1 and the ongoing serious risks for animal and human health and trade, the CFIA continues planning for humane depopulation with veterinary oversight at the infected premises.
The CFIA does not generally release details about the operations of individual farms to help protect the privacy of producers. Accordingly, specific operational plans and dates will not be shared with the public in advance.
The CFIA takes the responsibility to protect the health of animals and Canadians extremely seriously as we conduct these necessary disease control measures to protect public health and minimize the economic impact on Canada's poultry industry.